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This report provides an overview of judicial decisions concerning 
the constitutionality of State-sponsored religious activities in the 
public schools. Particular attention is paid to the Supreme Court's 
decisions regarding State-sponsored prayer and Bible reading and State- 
sponsored religious teaching in the public schools. The purpose of the 
report is to clarify the distinction that has been established in the 
courts between those State-sponsored activities regarding religion which 
are constitutionally permissible and those which violate the First Amend- 
ment. 
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PRAYER ANT RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: 
WHAT IS, AND IS NOT, PERMITTED 
Introduction 
Few areas of constitutional law have proven to be as controversial 
and as subject to misinterpretation as that concerning the constitutionality 
of government-sponsored religious activities in the public schools. In the 
last three decades the Supreme Court in five decisions and the State arid lower 
Federal courts in dozens of related decisions have attempted to articulate the 
1 / 
meaning of the religion clauses of the First ~mendment- for a variety of such 
activities, including State-sponsored prayer, Bible reading, and religious 
teaching. Notwithstanding continuing political controversy over many of these 
decisions, they provide a fairly consistent interpretation and application of 
the First Amendment. The purpose of this report is to summarize the Supreme 
Court's decisions in this area and their subsequent application in diverse 
situations by State and lower Federal courts, to the end that a clear view may 
be obtained regarding what government-sponsored activities regarding religion 
are, and are not, constitutionally permissible in the public schools. 
Supreme Court Decisions 
(a) State-Sponsored Prayer and Bible Reading: In two decisions in 1962 
and 1963 the Supreme Court held the establishment of religion clause of the 
First Amendment to be violated by State sponsorship of such devotional activities 
2 / - 
as prayer and Bible reading in the public schools. In Engel v. Vitale the 
1/ The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.. . . " The 
Court has held these restrictions to apply to the States as well through the due - -  - - 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296 (1941); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
2/ 370 U.S. 421 (1962). - 
Court  was conf ron ted  w i t h  a  requi rement  of a  l o c a l  board of educa t ion  i n  New 
York t h a t  s t u d e n t s  r e c i t e  a t  t h e  beginning of each schoo l  day t h e  fo l lowing  
p r a y e r ,  which had been composed and recommended by t h e  New York S t a t e  Board 
of  Regents: 
Almighty God, we acknowledge our  dependence upon Thee, and we 
beg Thy b l e s s i n g s  upon u s ,  our  p a r e n t s ,  our  t e a c h e r s  and our  
Country. 
3 / 
The fo l lowing  y e a r  i n  Abington School  D i s t r i c t  v. s c h e m p p  (and i t s  companion 
c a s e  of Murray v. C u r l e t t )  t h e  Court  was confronted  w i t h  S t a t e  requi rements  
t h a t  each  schoo l  day begin  w i t h  r e a d i n g s  from t h e  B ib le  and t h e  unison  r e c i t a l  
of t h e  Lord ' s  P raye r .  I n  each  c a s e  t h e  S t a t e s  made p r o v i s i o n  f o r  t h e  excusa l  
o r  n o n p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of s t u d e n t s ,  a t  t h e i r  r e q u e s t  o r  t h e  r e q u e s t  of a  pa ren t  
o r  guardian .  
4 / -
Notwi ths tanding  t h e  a p p a r e n t l y  "voluntary"  n a t u r e  of t h e  e x e r c i s e s ,  t h e  
5  / - 6 / 
Cour t ,  by a 6-1 m a j o r i t y  i n  ~ n ~ e l -  and a n  8-1 m a j o r i t y  i n  Schempp, s t r u c k  them 
down a s  v i o l a t i v e  of t h e  e s t ab l i shmen t  c l a u s e  of t h e  F i r s t  Amendment. I n  Engel 
3 1  374 U.S. 203 ( 1 9 6 3 ) .  - 
4 1  It should  be noted  t h a t  i n  n e i t h e r  ca se  d i d  t h e  Court make any f i n d i n g  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  whether  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  e x e r c i s e s  was i n  f a c t  vo lun ta ry ,  
because t h a t  i s s u e  was no t  m a t e r i a l  t o  i t s  d e c i s i o n s .  It sugges ted ,  i n  f a c t ,  
t h a t  because of compulsory schoo l ing ,  pee r  p r e s s u r e ,  and t h e  o f f i c i a l  s a n c t i o n  
g iven  t h e  e x e r c i s e s ,  "voluntary"  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  might be an  i m p o s s i b i l i t y .  See 
Engel  v. V i t a l e ,  sup ra ,  a t  431 and Abington School D i s t r i c t  v. Schempp, sup ra ,  a t  
223 .  
5 1  J o i n i n g  i n  J u s t i c e  B lack ' s  op in ion  f o r  t h e  Court were Chief J u s t i c e  Warren 
and ~ C s t i c e s  'Douglas, C la rk ,  Har lan ,  and Brennan, w i t h  J u s t i c e  Douglas a u t h o r i z i n g  
a concur ing  op in ion  a s  we l l .  J u s t i c e  S tewar t  au thored  a d i s s e n t i n g  opin ion .  
J u s t i c e s  F r a n k f u r t e r  and White d i d  no t  p a r t i c i p a t e .  
6 /  J o i n i n g  i n  J u s t i c e  C l a r k ' s  op in ion  f o r  t h e  Court were Chief J u s t i c e  Warren 
and ~ z s t i c e s  Black,  Douglas, Har lan ,  Brennan, White, and Goldberg, w i t h  J u s t i c e s  
Douglas,  Brennan, and Goldberg each  a u t h o r i n g  a concur r ing  op in ion  a s  we l l .  J u s t i c e  
S tewar t ,  a s  i n  Engel ,  submit ted  a d i s s e n t i n g  opin ion .  
J u s t i c e  Black conc luded  f o r  t h e  Cour t :  
... t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o h i b i t i o n  a g a i n s t  l aws  r e s p e c t i n g  an 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of r e l i g i o n  must a t  l e a s t  mean t h a t  i n  t h i s  
c o u n t r y  i t  i s  no p a r t  o f  t h e  b u s i n e s s  of government t o  compose 
o f f i c i a l  p r a y e r s  f o r  any g roup  of  t h e  American p e o p l e  t o  r e c i t e  
a s  a  p a r t  of  a  r e l i g i o u s  program c a r r i e d  on by government.  
.. . (G)overnment i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y ,  be i t  s t a t e  o r  f e ? r r a l ,  i s  
w i t h o u t  power t o  p r e s c r i b e  by law any  p a r t i c u l a r  form o f  p r a y e r  
which i s  t o  be used  a s  a n  o f f i c i a l  p r a y e r  i n  c a r r y i n g  on any 
program o f  g o v e r n m e n t a l l y  sponsored  r e l i g i o u s  a c t i v i t y .  370 
U.S. a t  425 and 4 3 0 .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  i n  Schempp J u s t i c e  C l a r k  conc luded  f o r  t h e  Cour t :  
[The B i h l e - r e a d i n g  e x e r c i s e s ]  a r e  r e l i g i o u s  e x e r c i s e s ,  
r e q u i r e d  by t h e  S t a t e s  i n  v i o l a t i o n  of t h e  command of  
t h e  F i r s t  Amendment t h a t  t h e  Government m a i n t a i n  s t r i c t  
n e u t r a l i t y ,  n e i t h e r  a i d i n g  n o r  oppos ing  r e l i g i o n .  
374 U.S. 203.  
I n  bo th  o p i n i o n s  t h e  Cour t  looked beyond t h e  immediate  words of t h e  es- 
t a b l i s h m e n t  c l a u s e  t o  d e t e r m i n e  i t s  meaning. I n  Enge l  J u s t i c e  Black ,  c a n v a s s i n g  
c o l o n i a l  and p r e - c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  h i s t o r y ,  found two broad  p u r p o s e s  beh ind  r h e  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  c l a u s e :  
I t s  f i r s t  and most i-mmediate purpose  r e s t e d  on t h e  b e l i e f  
t h a t  a  un ion  of  govc-rnment and r e l i g i o n  t e n d s  t o  d e s t r o y  
government and t o  dtagrade r e l i g i o n . .  .The E s t a b l i s h m e n t  
Clause  t h u s  s t a n d s  i ~ s  a s  e x p r e s s i o n  of p r i n c i p l e  on t h e  
p a r t  of  t h e  Founders  of o u r  C o n s t i t u t i o n  t h a t  r e l i g i o n  
i s  t o o  p e r s o n a l ,  t o o  s a c r e d ,  t o o  h o l y ,  t o  p e r m i t  i t s  
"unhal lowed p e r v e r s i o n "  by a c i v i l  m a g i s t r a t e .  370 U.S. 
431-32. 
The second p u r p o s e ,  J u s t i c e  Black  s a i d ,  " r e s t e d  upon a n  awareness  of  t h e  
h i s t o r i c a l  f a c t  t h a t  g o v e r n m e n t a l l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  r e l i g i o n s  and r e l i g i o u s  pe rsecu-  
t i o n s  go hand i n  hand": 
I t  was i n  l a r g e  p a r t  t o  g e t  c o m p l e t e l y  away from ... s y s t e m a t i c  r e l i g i o u s  p e r s e c u t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
Founders  b r o u g h t  i n t o  b e i n g  o u r  N a t i o n ,  o u r  Cons- 
t i t u t i o n ,  and o u r  B i l l  o f  R i g h t s  w i t h  i t s  p r o h i b i t i o n  
a g a i n s t  any  governmenta l  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  r e l i g i o n .  
I d . ,  a t  433 .  - 
Justice Clark in Schempp, agreeing with these conclusions, examined 
the previous decisions of the Court concerning the establishment clause 
and concluded that those decisions "rejected unequivocally the contention 
that the Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one 
religion over another." 374 U.S. at 216. Taken together with the free exer- 
cise clause, he said, the establishment clause imposes on government a "whole- 
some neutr.alityW toward religion. It can neither favor one sect over all others, 
nor religion generally over non-religion, nor non-religion over religion. 
Cyrstallizing the Court's decisions in this area into tests that can be applied 
to particular legislative enactments, Justice C1,ark said: 
The test m y  be stated as follows: What are the 
purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? 
If either is the advancement or inhibition of re- 
ligion the enactment exceeds the scope of legis- 
lative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. 
That is to say that to withstand the strictures of 
the ~stablishment Clause there must be a secular 
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither 
advances nor inhibits relieion. 7 1  374 U.S. at 222. 
In both cases the Court rejected the argument that the "voluntary" nature 
of the prayer and Bible-reading exercises freed them from the strictures of 
the establishment clause: 
The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise 
Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct 
governmental compulsion and is violated by the en- 
actment of laws which establish an official religion 
whether those laws operate directly to coerce non- 
observing individuals or not. Engel v. Vitale, 
supra, at 421. 
71 In subsequent cases, the Court has continued to use the tests articulated 
by ~ustice Clark and has added a third test: whether the legislative enactment 
leads to excessive government entanglement with religion. & v. Tax Com- 
mission of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
CRS- 5 
It rejected as well the arguments that to deny States the power to prescribe 
8 / 
religious activities in the public schools indicates hostility toward religion, 
that the encroachments on the First Amendment made by state-prescribed prayer 
and Bible reading in the public schools are so minor and insignificant as to 
9 1 - ,  
be de minimis, and that the exercises should be permitted as the free exercise 
lo/ -
of religion by the majority. 
In sum, then, by decisive majorities the Court in Engel and Schempp found 
State sponsorship of prayer and Bible-reading in the public schools to consti- 
tute an establishment of religion and thus to be beyond government's cons- 
titutional power. 
8 /  Justice Black in Engel noted that those who led the fight for religious 
freedom were themselves religious men and that the First Amendment grew out 
of "an awareness that governments of the past had shackled men's tongues to 
make them speak and to pray only to the God that government wanted them to 
pray to." Thus, he concluded: 
It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say 
that each separate government in this country should 
stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning of- 
ficial prayers and leave that purely religious function 
to the people themselves and to those the people choose 
to look to for religious guidance. 370 U.S. at 421. 
Justice Clark said: 
The breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream 
may all too soon become a raging torrent and, in the 
words of Madison, "it is proper to take alarm at the 
first experiment on our liberties." 374 U.S. at 225. 
Justice Clark said: 
While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the 
use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise 
to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could 
use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs. 
374 U.S. at 226. 
(b) State-Sponsored Religious Teaching: In three decisions the Court 
has also held that the First Amendment is violated by State sponsorship of 
religious teaching in the public schools, in whatever form, but that 
it is constitutionally permissible for the schools to accommodate private 
programs of religious instruction given off the school grounds. In the -
11 / 
first case of McCollum v .  Board of   ducat ion- the Court held unconstitutional, 
12 1 -
8-1, a "shared time" program in which religion teachers employed by private 
religious groups were permitted to come into the public schools each week to 
teach religion to consenting students: The schools did not employ the teachers 
but cooperated closely with the program. The teachers were subject to the 
approval and supervision of the superintendent of schools; reports of students' 
attendance at the classes were made to the school; non-participating students 
were required to go elsewhere in the school building. The Court found the 
program to constitute "a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported 
public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith." As 
such, the Court said, "...it falls squarely under the ban of the First 
Amendment" : 
... a state cannot consistently with the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments utilize its public school system to aid any or all 
religious faiths or sects in the dissemination of their doc- 
trines and ideals....333 U.S. at 211. 
13 / - 14 / -
Five years later in Zorach v. Clausen, the Court upheld, 6-3, the 
1 2 1  Justice Black authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
~ u s t i z  Vinson and Justices Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge, and Burton joined. 
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson authored concurring opinions, in the 
former of which Justices Jackson, Rutledge, and Burton joined. Justice 
Reed dissented. 
131 343 U.S. 306 (1952). -
141 Justice Douglas authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
~ u s t i z  Vinson and Justices Reed, Burton, Clark, and Minton joined. Justices 
Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson each authored dissents. 
constitutionality of "released" or "dismissed" time programs in which 
public school students are permitted during the school day to leave 
the school grounds in order to repair to nearby religious centers for 
religious instruction or devotional exercises. Writing for the Court, 
Justice Douglas differentiated such programs from that struck down in 
McCollum by stating: 
In the McCollum case the classrooms were used for religious 
instruction and the force of the public school was used to 
promote that instruction. Here...the public schools do no 
more than accommodate their schedules to a program of outside 
religious instruction. 343 U.S. at 315. 
The First Amendment, the Court stated, forbids any "concert or union or 
dependency" between church and State, but it does not require that they 
"be aliens to each other--hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly." In 
oft-quoted dicta the Court concluded: 
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a 
Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one 
chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs 
and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. 
We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows 
no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish 
according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeals of its 
dogma. When the state encourages religious instruction or 
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule 
of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of 
our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature 
of our people and accommodates the public service to their 
spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find 
in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a 
callous indifference to religious groups. 343 U.S. at 313-14. 
15/ 
Finally, in Epperson v. ~rkansasthe Court unanimously held unconsti- 
tutional a State statute which forbade teachers, upon pain of criminal penalty, 
from teaching the Darwinian theory of evolution. The statute was a variation 
16 /  -
of the one involved in the famous Scopes trial in 1927, and made it unlawful 
151 393 U.S. 97 (1968). -
161 Though Scopes' conviction was overturned by the Tennessee Supreme Court, 
the statute was held constitutional. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 
363 (1927). 
for any teacher to teach or to use a textbook which taught "the theory 
or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of 
animals." The Court found that "fundamentalist sectarian conviction was 
and is the law's reason for existence," and because of that held the statute 
to violate the First Amendment. Writing for the Court, Justice Fortas stated: 
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be 
neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. 
It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of 
no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one re- 
ligion or religious theory against another or even against 
the militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates govern- 
memtal neutrality between religion and religion, and between 
religion and nonreligion ....( T)he First Amendment does not 
permit the State to require that teaching and learning must 
be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious 
sect or dogma. 393 U.S. at 103-104, 106. 
The State might have acted in a religiously neutral manner, Justice Fortas 
suggested, if it had simply excised from its curricula all discussion of 
the origins of mankind. But instead, he said, the State tried to blot out 
a particular theory because of its "supposed conflict" with "a particular 
interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular religious group." 
That effort, he said, was "plainly" unconstitutional. 
The Scope of the Decisions 
(a) What Is Constitutionally Permitted 
The Supreme Court, despite several opportunities, has to date chosen to 
review no further cases concerning the constitutionality of State-sponsored 
religious activities in the public schools. Nonetheless, the decisions sum- 
marized above, coupled with dicta in the Court's opinions and related State 
and lower Federal court decisions, make clear that not all State-sponsored 
activities relating to religion in the public schools are constitutionally 
forbidden. The constitutional permissibility of "released" or "dismissed" 
time programs, for instance, has in no way been diminished by subsequent 
CRS- 9 
171 -
developments in the law. Similarly, dicta in Supreme Court opinions 
and related State and lower Federal court decisions have consistently 
affirmed the constitutionality of a State requiring a moment of silence 
181 -
at the beginning of the school day. The courts have also affirmed 
the constitutionality of the State sponsoring objective teaching about 
religion and about the Bible as part of a secular program 
171 Zorach v. Clauson, supra; Smith v. Smith, 391 F.  Supp. 443 
(w.D.F~.), reversed, 523 F. 2d 121 (4th Cir. 1975), -- cert. den. 423 U.S. 
1073 (1976); State ex rel. Holt -v. Thompson, 66 Wis. 2d 659, 225 N.W. 2d 
678 (1975); Lanner v. Wimmer 463 F. Supp. 867 (D. Utah 1978). 
-9 
181 The Supreme Court has considered no case raising the issue of the 
const%utionality of a State-mandated moment of silence at the beginning 
of each school day, but Justice Brennan, in oft-quoted language from a 
concurring opinion in Abington, perceived no constitutional objection: 
The second justification (for prayer and Bible reading 
exercises) assumes that religious exercises at the start 
of the school day may directly serve solely secular ends-- 
for example, by fostering harmony and tolerance among the 
pupils, enhanding the authority of the teacher, and inspiring 
better discipline. To the extent that such benefits result 
not from the content of the readings and recitation, but 
simply from the holding of such a solemn exercise at the 
opening assembly or the first class of the day, it would seem 
that less sensitive materials might equally well serve the 
same purpose .... It has not been shown that reading from the 
speeches and messages of great Americans, for example, or 
from the documents of our heritage of liberty, daily recitation - 
of the Pledge of Allegiance, or even the observance of a moment 
of reverent silence at the opening of class, may not adequately 
serve the solely secular purposes of the devotional activities 
without jeopardizing either the religious liberties of any 
members of the community or the proper degree of separation 
between the spheres of religion and government. Abington 
School District v. Schempp, supra, at 280-81 (Bren~an, J. 
concurring) (emphasis added). 
See also Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass., 1976) (State statute 
prescribing a moment of silence at the beginning of each school day for pur- 
poses of "meditation or prayer" held constitutional) and Opinion of the 
Justices, 108 N.H. 97, 228 A. 2d 161 (1967) and Opinion of the Justices, 
113 N.H. 297, 307 A. 2d 558 (1973) (advisory opinions affirming the consti- 




of instruction. The courts have also uniformly upheld the inclusion 
20/ 
of invocations and benedictions in commencement ceremonies- and have 
found constitutional objections to baccalaureate services to be insub- 
21 / -
stantial. Finally, the First Amendment has been consistently inter- 
preted to pose no bar to States providing opportunities for students to 
participate in ceremonial or patriotic exercises which incidentally involve 
a profession of faith, such as the singing of the national anthem, the recital 
19/ In Engel the Court noted: -
... it might well be said that one's education is not 
complete without a study of comparative religion or the 
history of religion and its relationship to the advance- 
ment of civilization. It certainly may be said that the 
Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic 
qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such 
study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objective- 
ly as part of a secular program of education, may not be 
effected consistently with the First Amendment. 374 U.S. 
203, 225. 
In Epperson it reiterated: 
... study of religions and of the Bible from a literary and 
historic viewpoint, presented objectively as part of a secular 
program of education, need not collide with the First Amend- 
ment's prohibition .... 393 U.S. 97, 106. 
See also Florey v. Sioux Falls School District 49-5, 619 F. 2d 1311 (8th 
Cir. 1980) (school board regulation permitting observance of holidays 
having both a religious and secular basis upheld); Calvary Presbyterian 
Church v. University of Washington, 72 Wash. 2d 912, 436 P. 2d 189 (1967) 
(constitutionality of college-level course entitled "The Bible As Literature" 
affirmed); Wiley ;. ~ranklin, 474 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (constitu- 
tionality of Bible as literature course taught by teachers with bachelor's 
degrees in Biblical literature upheld); Todd v. Rochester Community Schools, 
41 Mich. App. 320 200 N.W. 2d 90 (1972) (constitutionality of using book 
containing religious references in literature course upheld). 
20/ - Wood v. Mt.Lebanon Tomship School District, 342 F. Supp. 1293 (W.D.Pa. 
1972);~rossber~ v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285 (E .D.Va. 1974);. Wiest v. - Mt.
Lebanon School District, 457 Pa. 166, 320 A. 2d 362, -- cert. den. 419 U.S. 
967 (1974). 
211 Goodwin v. Cross County School District No. 7, 394 F. Supp. 417 
(E.D.A~~. 1973); Chamberlin v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction, 171 So. 
2d 535 (Fla. 1965). 
CRS- 11 
of the pledge of allegiance, and the reading of historical documents 
22 / -
such as the Declaration of Independence. 
(b) What Is Constitutionally Prohibited 
Nevertheless, the scope .of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment 
remains broad: The First Amendment denies government any power to conduct or 
sponsor or prescribe religious teaching or devotional exercises in the public 
schools, even though participation therein may be "voluntary." Government may 
not tailor the public school curriculum to the principles or prohibitions of 
22/ In Engel the Court noted: -
There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that 
is inconsistent with the fact that school children and 
others are officially encouraged to express love for our 
country by reciting historical documents such as the 
Declaration of Independence which contain references to the 
Deity or by singing officially espoused anthems which 
include the composer's professions of faith in a Supreme 
Being, or with the fact that there are many manifestations 
in our public life of belief in God. Such patriotic or 
ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to the un- 
questioned religious exercise that the State of New York 
has sponsored in this instance. Engel v. Vitale, supra, at 
421, ftnt. 21. 
See also Sheldon v. Fannin 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963) (singing of 
-9 
national anthem in public schools held not to violate establishment clause); 
Smith v. Denny, 280 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Cal. 1968), appeal dism'd 417 F. 2d 
614 (9th Cir. 1969) (requirement that students recite daily the pledge of 
allegiance upheld); Opinion of the Justices, 113 N.H. 297, 307 A. 2d 558 
(1973) (advisory opinion that statute empowering school districts to provide 
for the voluntary daily recitation of pledge of allegiance would be consti- 
tutional). It appears clear that student participation in exercises involving 
incidental professions of faith or other affirmations of belief must be volun- 
tary to comport with the First Amendment. West Virginia Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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any particular sect or dogma. It may not permit private teachers to 
use the school premises for the purpose of giving religious instruction to 
24 / -
consenting students during the school day. It may not sponsor or pre- 
scribe devotional exercises such as prayer and Bible reading as a regular 
251 -
part of the school curriculum. Finally, it may not permit the public 
schools to be used as the medium for the distribution of such sectarian 
231 Epperson v. Arkansas, supra; Wright v. Houston Independent School 
~ i s t r G t ,  366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd 486 F. 2d 137 (5th Cir. 
1973), cert. den. sub nom. Brown v. Houston Independent School District, 417 -----
U.S. 969 (1974) (First Amendment held not to compel school districts to include 
other theories regarding origins of man in addition to theory of evolution); 
Daniel v. Waters, 515 F. 2d 485 (6th Cir.) -- on remand, 399 F. Supp. 510 
(M.D. Tenn. 1975) (statute prescribing inclusion of Genesis account in any 
presentation of theories of the creation of man and the universe and exclusion 
of all "occult or satanical" theories held unconstitutional); Smith v. State 
of Mississippi, 242 So. 2d 692 (Miss. 1970) (same as Epperson); Malnak v. Yogi, 
592 F. 2d 197 (2d Cir. 1979) (teaching Transcendental Meditation in public 
schools held to violate establishment clause); Lanner v. Wimmer, 463 F. Supp. 
867 (D. Utah 1978) (giving of course credit for Bible courses taught in "released" 
time program held unconstitutional); Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133 
(E.D. Tenn. 1979) (public school Bible study course that was primarily religious 
rather than of an historical, literary, or otherwise secular nature held 
unconstitutional). 
24/ McCollum v. Board of Education, supra. -
251 State and lower Federal court cases subsequent to Engel and Schemp 
have zvolved forms of State-sponsored prayer and/or Bible reading identicalEto 
those in Engel and Schempp and numerous variants. None, with the exception of 
State ~rescriotion of a moment for silent meditation, has survived constitutional 
scrutiny. See, e.g., Alabama Civil Liberties Union v. Wallace, 331 F. Supp. 
966 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd 456 F. 2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1972) (State statute prescribing 
daily Bible reading held unconstitutional); Rent v. Commissioner of Education, 
402 N.E. 2d 1340 (Mass. 1980) (State statute prescribing daily period of prayer 
in public schools held unconstitutional); DeSpain v. DeKalb County School District, 
225 F. Supp. 655 (N.D. Ill. 1966), reversed 384 F. 2d 936 (7th Cir. 1967), 
cert. den. 390 U.S. 906 (1968) (teacher sponsorship of pre-snack verse of 
thanks by kindergarten children held unconstitutional); State Board of Education 
v. Board of Education of Netcong, New Jersey, 108 N.J. Sup. 564, 262 A. 2d 21 
affirmed 57 N.J. 172, 270 A. 2d 412 (1970), -- cert. den. 401 U.S. 1013 (1971) 
(school board sponsorship of daily "free exercise of religion" period during which 
student read aloud prayers from the Congressional Record held unconstitutional); 
Collins v. Chandler Unified School District, 470 F. Supp, 959 (D. Ariz. 1979) 




literature as Gideon Bibles to consenting school children. 
(c) Issues Not Yet Definitively Resolved 
Contrary decisions have been rendered by State and lower Federal courts 
on two matters in this area, however--(l) whether the First Amendment permits 
school officials to accommodate students who at their own initiative wish to 
join together for devotional prayer and Bible reading on school premises during 
the school day, and (2) whether it permits school officials to post the Ten 
Commandments or other religious statements on classroom walls. With respect to 
the first issue, the courts have consistently held that at the elementary and 
secondary school level it is within the discretionary authority of school 
officials to bar all use of school facilities for student-initiated religious 
- 7 ,  
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activities. In addition, two State appellate courts and one Federal district 
court have gone further and held that the establishment clause requires that such 
student-initiated activities on school property at the elementary and secondary 
levels be barred, that is, that school officials are constitution all^ forbidden 
28 / -
from accommodating such student activities on school property. At the college 
level, however, contrary decisions have been rendered on this issue, one State 
26/ Tudor v. Board of Education of Borough of Rutherford, 14 N.J. 31, 
100 ~7-2d 857 (1953), cert. den. 348 U.S. 816 (1955); Brown v. Orange County --
Board of Public Instruction, 128 So. 2d 181 (Fla. App. 1960), aff'd 155 So. 2d 371 
(Fla. 1963); Goodwin v. Cross County School District No. 7, 394 F. Supp. 417 - 
(E.D. Ark. 1973); Heltzer v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, Florida, 
548 F. 2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977), on rehearing en banc, 577 F. 2d 311 (5th Cir. 1978), 
cert. den. 439 U.S. 1089 (1979). --
27/ Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F. 2d 999 (2d Cir.), cert. den. 382 U.S. 957 --
(1965x Hunt v. Board of Education of Kanawha County, West Virginia, 321 F. Supp. -
1263 (S.D. W. Va. 1971); Trietley v. Board of Education of City of Buffalo, 65 
App. Div. 2d 1, 409 N.Y.S. 2d 912 (1978). 
28/ Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School District, 137 Cal. -
Rptr. 43,68 Cal. App. 3d 1, cert. den. 434 U.S. 877 (1977); Trietley v. --
Board of Education of City of Buffalo, supra; Brandon v. Board of Education 
of Guilderland Central School, 487 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D.N.Y. 1980). 
supreme court holding that an even-handed policy permitting the religious use 
of university space is permitted by the establishment clause and, perhaps, required 
29 /  -
by the free exercise clause, one Federal district court holding a university 
policy forbidding the regular use of university space for worship by recognized 
30 I -
student groups to be required by the establishment clause. Thus, though 
the trend and weight of decisional authority on this issue suggests that student- 
initiated use of school facilities for religious purposes implicates the State 
in religious activity in violation of the establishment clause, particularly at 
the elementary and secondary level, it may be premature to deem this issue 
to be definitively resolved. 
With respect to the second issue, the split in judicial authority is less one- 
sided: Two State supreme courts have upheld the constitutionality of the 
31 I - 32 / 
State posting the Ten commandments- or plaques with the phrase "In God We Trust" 
on the classroom walls, while one Federal district court has held the posting 
331 -
of the Ten Commandments to violate the establishment clause. Thus, on this 
issue no trend of judicial decision would as yet appear evident. 
29/ Keegan v. University of Delaware, 349 A. 2d 14 (Del. 1975), cert. den. 
424 UZ. 934 (1976). 
301 Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979). - -
311 Stone v. Graham, 599 S. W. 2d 157 (Ky. 1980). - -
321 Opinion of the Justices, 108 N.H. 97, 228 A. 2d 161 (1967). -




Because both the establishment and free exercise clauses are worded 
as absolutes, it is sometimes ambiguous whether governmental involvement in 
a given activity is a permissible accommodation of religion or a forbidden 
establishment of religion. But the essential meaning of this part of the 
First Amendment that has been elaborated by the courts over the last three 
decades would appear to be that government must be neutral regarding religious 
faith, serving neither as its agent or advocate nor as its adversary. P a r  
ticularly in its role as educator, government is required to be objective and 
impartial about religion, not partisan. 
The result of this interpretation of the First Amendment is that government 
has been held to be constitutionally barred from using its authority to 
inculcate or proselytize about, or to permit others to inculcate or proselytize 
about, religious faith in the public school, whether by means of sponsorship of 
prayer, Bible reading, sectarian instruction, or distribution of sectarian 
literature. On the other hand, governmental involvement in a number of activities 
has been found to have neither the purpose nor a primary effect of advancing 
religion and thus to be constitutionally permissible--teaching about religion 
and religious literature as part of a secular program of instruction, sponsoring 
religiously neutral moments of silence, prescribing ceremonial or patriotic 
exercises which may incidentally involve professions of faith, and accommodating 
private programs of religious instruction given off the school premises. 
Whether accommodation of student-initiated religious groups on school 
property or posting of wall plaques containing religious sentiments in class- 
CRS- 1 6  
rooms violates government's essential neutrality regarding religion has not yet 
been definitively adjudicated. But after three decades of litigation the general 
thrust of the First Amendment in this area would appear to be clear: In the 
public schools government must be neutral and objective regarding religion. 
